Why some individuals, who would clearly benefit from redistribution, do not vote for parties offering redistributive policies, is an old puzzle of redistributive politics. Recent work in political economy offers an explanation based on the interplay between religious identity and party policies. Strategic parties bundle conservative moral policies with antiredistribution positions inducing individuals with a strong religious identity to vote based on moral rather than economic preferences. I test this theory using micro-level data on individuals' vote choices in 24 recent multi-party elections in 15 Western European countries. I use an integrated model of religion, economic and moral preferences, and vote choice, to show that religious individuals possess less liberal economic preferences, which shapes their vote choice against redistributive parties. This holds even for individuals who would clearly benefit from redistribution. Moreover, the redistributive vote of religious individuals is primarily based on economic not moral preferences.
Why do the poor not expropriate the rich? This puzzle has captured thinkers since (at least) John Stuart Mill, who expressed the fear that "those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economise" and instead they "put their hands into the people's pockets for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one" (Mill 2007: 281) . A more analytical implementation of this view is the famous model by Meltzer and Richard (1981) , which is however not well supported by empirical research (Rodriguez 1999; Gouveia and Masia 1998; Moene and Wallerstein 2003) . While the introduction of general suffrage in the West has been accompanied by rising welfare state activity, the level of redistribution is far smaller than predicted by purely self-interest based models, and a substantial number of individuals make political choices that seem to contradict their economic interests (Alesina and Giuliano 2011) .
In this paper, I argue that religion plays an important role in solving this puzzle. I build on recent research in political sociology and economics, which stresses the continuing importance of the religious cleavage (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997; Brooks and Manza 2004; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007; Stegmueller et al. 2012 ) and the effects of religious identity (a micro-level manifestation of religious cleavages) on conservative moral and economic preferences (Guiso et al. 2003 (Guiso et al. , 2006 Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Stegmueller et al. 2012) . 1 Theoretical work in political economy shows that policy interested parties respond to these predictable micro-level patterns by bundling economic and moral policies (Roemer 1998 (Roemer , 2001 Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004) . Combining these perspectives, I link religion to economic preferences and to redistributive vote choice, and argue that religious individuals refrain from voting for redistributive parties, because they are more conservative, both morally and economically, than their secular counterparts.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next two sections, I present my argument and testable hypotheses. Data from 24 multiparty elections in 15 Western European countries between 1999 and 2008 is described next. I then set up a hierarchical structural model, which allows for an explicit test of the link between religion, preferences, and redistributive voting. The following section describes the results and presents several key quantities of interests. The final section concludes the paper. An [online] appendix contains further robustness checks and details of the data used.
sional) economic policy dimension, on which parties position themselves in response to the distribution of individual preferences (Mueller 2003: ch. 11; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Downs 1957 ). Which economic policy individuals prefer is derived from their economic position, usually captured by income or some measure of skill or economic class (e.g. Meltzer and Richard 1981: 917; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Moene and Wallerstein 2003; ?; Iversen 2006) . However, this setup has clear limits when trying to capture heterogeneity in redistributive voting between individuals. Therefore, a more complex view is offered by John Roemer (1998 Roemer ( , 2001 Roemer ( , 2005 , who uses a two-dimensional model of political competition. Parties compete using two issue dimensions: an economic, redistribution dimension, and a non-economic, moral dimension (Warwick 2002 , Bornschier 2010 and Kriesi 2010 provide evidence on the two-dimensionality of the policy space in Western Europe). Parties do so because citizens do not just have simple uni-dimensional economic preferences. In addition to their economic preferences, they are assumed to also posses moral preferences or "principles" (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Roemer 2005: 514) . 2 But parties are not distributed uniformly in this two-dimensional space. Rather, they offer policies in packages: if you want conservative moral policy, you will have to 'buy' anti-redistribution policies as well. This is the core idea of Roemer's model. The spatial configuration of party policy bundles induces individual behavior, which might seem irrational from a purely economic point of view. For example a worker -who is assumed to be economically liberal -does not vote for a redistributive party. He does so because he is religious and holds conservative moral preferences, which are best represented by a conservative party.
The empirical result of this process is shown in Figure 1 . It shows positions of West European parties in a two-dimensional issue space composed of economic and moral policies. 3 Most parties seem to bundle economic and moral policy. Parties that offer pro-redistribution policies are usually socially liberal, whereas parties that run on antiredistribution platforms are predominantly socially conservative. This relationship is strong:
once we know a party's economic position, we can predict its stance on moral issues quite well, as indicated by a linear regression coefficient of 0.64 with a rather small standard error.
4 2 Clearly, in this model parties are not Downsian office-seekers but care about policies (Baron 1993; Roemer 2001: 91f.) . 3 Details on the measurement of parties' policy positions are in section "Data". 4 Running the same regression with 6 extreme points at the bottom and top (conservative Italian Christian parties and liberal Swedish lefts) removed yields a similar regression relationship of 0.59. 
Religiosity and economic preferences
But the relationship between religion and moral and economic preferences is more complex. Recent research in economics and sociology argues for a strong link between an individual's religiosity and his or her economic preferences (e.g Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Guiso et al. 2003 Guiso et al. , 2006 Alesina and Giuliano 2011) .
Following Stegmueller et al. (2012) , I conceptualize religiosity as consisting of two (theoretically) distinct components: (1) religious identity, i.e. wether someone identifies with one of the major christian denominations; and (2) church integration, i.e. the extent to which he or she participates in church activities. This distinction needs to be made not only because of its conceptual relevance (more below), but also because of the empirical fact that many individuals identify themselves with a religious group, but do not attend church regularly. Roughly 50 percent of Catholics and 75 percent of Protestants attend church only on special holy days or less. On the other hand, even in the "secular West" we still find a substantial group of individuals who attend church every week or even more often (12 percent of Protestants and 30 percent of Catholics).
5
Religious identity has a negative effect on redistributive voting, because individuals who identify with one of the major christian denominations hold strongly conservative economic preferences. Stegmueller et al. (2012) argue that these are rooted in a long history of church-state conflict over the provision of welfare (cf. Kahl 2005; Hicks 2006; Rossteutscher 2009) , which lead to a "pronounced anti welfare-state position" of churches and parties (Manow 2002:206) . Research on social identity has shown that individuals who self-categorize themselves into a social group will adapt the norms, world-views, and preferences that are dominant in that group (Tajfel 1981; Hogg et al. 1995; Huddy 2001) .
Hence, I argue that contemporary individuals who identify themselves as religious will hold anti-welfare and redistribution preferences. This effect of religious identity operates even when an individual does not attend church regularly, since (i) other mechanisms such as personal networks and parental socialization provide enough information about beliefs and preferences among religious individuals, and (ii) the self-identification mechanism works even in absence of social control (Abrams et al. 1990) .
Church integration has a separate negative effect on redistributive voting, because individuals who are more integrated in a church community are expected to hold more conservative economic preferences (Chen and Lind 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 2006; Stegmueller et al. 2012) . Integration into a religious community helps to insulate individuals against adverse life events, like becoming sick or unemployed, by providing them with material and psychic resources (Pergament 1997; Pargament 2002; Clark and Lelkes 2005) . Thus, church integration and state welfare spending are substitute goods: regular churchgoers, "irrespective of their denomination", "privately insure themselves via religion" and prefer less welfare provision by the state (Scheve and Stasavage 2006: 256,263) .
6
The previous discussion shows that religion shapes individuals' economic and moral preferences and helps to explain why parties are able to offer such clearly bundled economic and moral polices. If religion plays a significant role in an individual's vote function, 5 Numbers are calculated from European Social Survey data for fifteen West European countries, described below.
6 Scheve and Stasavage (2006) describe their understanding of religion as "religious involvement" or "degree of religiosity" (p. 257), but it is clear from their model that their argument builds on an individual's level of church attendance. no trade-off exists between voting based on economic and moral preferences, since he or she will shun from electing redistributive parties on both moral and economic grounds.
Hypotheses
From this general discussion, I construct the following testable hypotheses about religion, preferences and vote choice. First, following the discussion on the continuing relevance of the religious cleavage and its micro-level manifestation, religious social identities, I expect to find a negative effect of religious identity -self-categorizing as either Catholic or Protes- Third, in addition to the effect of religious identity, church integration has a further negative influence on the vote. Therefore, the church integration hypothesis (H3) states that irrespective of an individuals denomination, the more an individual attends church, the lower will be his or her propensity of voting for a redistributive party (H3a). As argued above, this is not only the result of an individuals' moral outlook, but also due to distinct anti-welfare preferences caused by religious insurance. Consequently, I expect to find that higher levels of church attendance are linked to conservative economic (H3b) and moral (H3c) preferences.
Data Redistributive parties
My dependent variable is an individual's choice of a redistributive party. Consequently, I employ a measure of how much redistribution a party proposes in their electoral platform.
Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 2001 ) and its 2009 update (Volkens et al. 2010) , I calculate the extent to which parties favor state involvement in the economy -a measure of redistributive politics proposed by Laver (2006, 2007) .
7 It is calculated from parties' statements to multiple economic topics (represented by "quasi sentences" in the CMP data set), which are combined into a measure of a party's policy position as the balance of positive (P) to negative (N) statements (Lowe et al. 2011) :
Parties can occupy any position on this scale, but more extreme positions need considerably more relative emphasis, yielding a magnitude scaling of policy positions. For each election between 1999 and 2008, I matched the corresponding individual level 7 One should note that using the CMP's simple "left-right" measure is misleading, since it carries surplus meaning which is not related to redistribution, such as positions on "traditional morality" (Huber and Stanig 2008) . Furthermore, simply classifying parties based on their name ('left') does not constitute a proper operationalization of the concept of redistributive voting, since country as well as election specific factors influence parties' policy positions on redistribution.
8 A small constant (.5) is added to prevent problems with low numbers of quasi sentences. The resulting party measure is insensitive to a range of choices (.1 . . . 1).
9 Some small, extreme parties are not represented in the data set, since the CMP contains no information on their position. An example is the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany, a nationalistic, extreme right party. However, the number of survey respondents that chose those parties is generally negligible.
10 This is the preferred strategy, since the interval level measure of party policy does not imply that zero is a centrist position and therefore the mean is the preferred reference point (cf. Lowe et al. 2011: 131). data from the European Social Survey.
11 If multiple waves were available, I used the one closest to the last election. 
Individual level variables
Economic and moral issue preferences are captured by two items, both measured on a Scheepers et al. (2002) show that this homosexuality item correlates highly with a general moral values factor, which includes attitudes to pre-marital sex and abortion. Nonetheless, multi-item measures for both concepts would be preferable, but are not available in the ESS.
12 .
An individual's religiosity is captured by his or her denomination and frequency of church attendance. Individuals are classified as either being Catholic or Protestant or having no denomination. 13 Church attendance is captured by a quasi metric variable for the 11 The ESS was designed from the beginning to be comparative and it has exceptionally high standards regarding the comparability of questionnaires, sampling designs and population coverage, making it an ideal tool to analyze a large number of countries simultaneously. Details on sampling designs, questionnaire translation, fieldwork and data documentation are available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
12 See Ansolabehere et al. (2008) for a discussion of the general advantages of multi-item measures, and Stegmueller (2011) for a discussion from an explicitly comparative perspective. 13 The small number (4% of respondents) of individuals belonging to "other" denominations (a rather heterogeneous group of Muslims and Eastern faiths) are grouped with "none". Alternatively, removing them prior to the analysis does not change results.
frequency with which our respondents visit church, ranging from never to daily attendance. Income is measured on the household level and is standardized to have a withincountry mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.
14 I include social class as a proxy for an individual's skill level and its associated labor market risks (?). 16 14 Respondents could give their income in weekly, monthly or annual figures. The first three waves of the European Social Survey provide a twelve category measure of income, whereas wave four provides country specific deciles. To create a comparable measure I standardize per country and survey wave. Note that De La O and Rodden (2008) find that the effect of income on redistributive voting is nonlinear, especially for the highest income group. To check for this possibility, I estimated a nonparametric model (Wood 2006; Keele 2008) for the effect of income. 15 My results show no sign of any nonlinearities, which suggests that their finding might be a result of the income measurement employed in the World Value Survey (see Figure A .1 in the appendix). Consequently, I specify the effect of income on redistributive voting as linear.
16 I use the European Socio-economic Classification (Rose and Harrison 2010), which codes detailed occupation-by-employment-status units into a categorical class scheme, to generate class indicators for working and service class positions, a group of intermediate positions, which are characterized by mixed employment contracts, and the self-employed. 17 To check if a linear specification for age is appropriate, I set up a model for the direct effects, where the age effect is estimated non-parametrically. Details are the same as for my nonparametric income model above. Nonparametric age estimates suggesting an effect decreasing at a roughly constant rate, which suggests that a linear specification captures the central feature of the data.
18 It has been pointed out repeatedly that listwise deletion of missing cases is a poor strategy (Allison 2001; Little and Rubin 2002; King et al. 2001) . Thus, I use multiple imputation via a chained equations approach. It imputes missing values by cycling over variables, imputing each as a function of all others. Whereas traditional imputation methods usually assume multivariate normality for all variables, this approach tailors each imputation equation to a variable's measurement level (Raghunathan et al. 2001; van Buuren et al. 2006; van Buuren 2007) . To insure that reasonable values have been imputed, I employ the diagnostic checks outlined by Abayomi et al. (2008) . I compute five imputations on which the following results are 
Here, β 1 is a vector that captures the effect of religious denomination and church attendance x i , while γ 1 and γ 2 capture the respective effect of economic and moral preferences on vote choice. Controls for further individual characteristics are placed in z i with associated regression weights δ 1 . Effects of religion on economic and moral preferences are based.
captured in β 2 and β 3 , respectively.
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Since unobserved heterogeneity between countries is likely to influence voting as well as preferences, I model country differences in levels of vote choice and preferences via country-election random effects, ξ v j (Ansari et al. 2002; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2007 ):
where (Winship and Mare 1983: 75) . In the online appendix I present a robust specification with instruments in z i2 and z i3 .
20 A more complex specification allows for correlations between the three different intercepts, modeled using a variance covariance matrix with an inverse Wishart distribution as its hyperprior. More specifically, I estimated ξ v· ∼ N (0, Ψ) with Ψ ∼ W −1 (I 3 , 4). However, this analysis has shown that no substantial correlation exists. The covariance between voting and economic preferences is 0.046 (with a standard error or 0.05), between voting and moral preferences it is 0.008 (0.039), and between economic and moral preferences −0.005 (0.029). Therefore, I retain the somewhat simpler (and computationally faster) model specification.
21 Diagnostic suggested by Gelman and Rubin (1992) and Cowles and Carlin (1996) indicate that both chains mix well and do not show signs of absence of convergence. I conducted several sensitivity analyses, to check the robustness of my results against different prior specifications. As an alternative prior for variances I use a prior that is uniform on the standard deviation as suggested by Gelman (2006) . To check the prior sensitivity of thresholds and regression coefficients, I use priors with variances twice as large. In all cases I obtained the same model results.
shape moral and economic preferences, respectively, and thus indirectly influence redistributive voting. One immediately notices that both economic and moral preferences play an important role in shaping redistributive vote choice. Individuals who hold liberal, proredistribution preferences and have liberal moral views are more likely to vote for a redistributive party. Thus hypothesis H1c -which is the prerequisite for all further discussionclearly holds: moral and economic conservatism is linked with a lower propensity to vote for a redistributive party.
As argued above, these preferences are endogenous and shaped by an individual's religion. As column two and three show, Catholics and Protestants are significantly more morally and economically conservative than the secular population, confirming the religious identity hypotheses, H1a & H1b. Therefore, in addition to the direct effects of religion on voting (as given in eq.1), religious identity also exerts a negative effect on the redistributive vote, channeled via economic and moral preferences, thus confirming hypothesis
H1d.
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Estimates of denomination effects in Table 1 already hint that effect differences between Catholic and Protestant are rather small -which was claimed by the religious cleavage hypotheses. A stricter test is presented in Figure 2 , which test effect differences between Catholics and Protestants for each equation. Shown are estimated differences together with their associated 95% credible intervals. 23 The difference is considerable larger for vote choice and moral preferences than for economic preferences, but in each case the absolute magnitude is negligible. Furthermore all credible intervals contain zero, showing that these differences are statistically insignificant. This confirms the religious cleavage hypotheses for both preferences and vote choice H2a-H2c and shows the importance of religious-secular differences for political preferences and choices.
I now turn from identity to behavior and examine the church integration hypotheses. We see that higher levels of church attendance go hand in hand with more conservative economic and moral preferences, as was predicted by hypotheses H3a and H3b. Consequently, we see that regular churchgoers have a lowered probability of voting for a redistributive party, thus confirming hypothesis H3c. However, in contrast to religious identity, which has 22 These effects are with church attendance held constant. I will relax this strict linear additive specification in section below, in order to examine how religious identity and church integration interact.
23 Credible intervals are the Bayesian analogue to the frequentist confidence interval. However, owing to the straightforward meaning of posterior probability in Bayesian analysis, they actually can be interpreted as region of confidence, i.e. the 95% probability that the effect difference lies in this region (Bernardo and Smith 2000; Jaynes 1976 Figure 2: Effect differences between denominations a stronger impact on economic than on moral preferences, the effect of church attendance in the moral preferences equation is seven times larger than for economic preferences.
This raises the suspicion that, contrary to the religious insurance argument (Scheve and Stasavage 2006) , the main mechanism linking church integration and redistributive nonvoting is not based on economic preferences (I will examine this question in more detail below).
Finally, estimates of an individual's socio-economic position in Table 1 confirm expected relationships. Individuals with higher incomes are slightly more socially liberal than the general population, but they are decidedly more economically conservative and have a lower propensity to vote for a redistributive party. The effect of education on economic preferences is much smaller but still negative and different from zero, while it is larger for moral preferences. 24 As expected, I find that individuals in service and working class occupations differ sharply from one another in their economic preferences. Working class individuals hold liberal economic preferences, whereas individuals in service class occupations are economically conservative. With regard to moral preferences, even after controlling for education, members of the service class are liberal while working class members are socially conservative (Lipset 1959 Gelman et al. 2008 and Gelman et al. 2010. however, they are more socially conservative even after taking into account the negative effect of age. Finally, I find that women hold more liberal economic and moral preferences than men, taking their socio-economic characteristics into account.
The final two rows of Table 1 show that there exists a good deal of unobserved heterogeneity between countries, especially with regard to vote choice and economic preferences.
By calculating the variance partition coefficient (often called intra class correlation), we see that almost 22 percent of unexplained variance in vote choice is due to country differences; the corresponding numbers for economic and moral preferences are twelve and six percent, respectively. Even so, this country heterogeneity does not distort my results (more details on robustness checks can be found in the appendix).
Religion and redistributive voting
I will now take a closer look at the effect of religious identity and church attendance on 
The role of economic and moral preferences
I now take a closer look religion's indirect effects, i.e. how it shapes voting via preferences.
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Indirect effects, shown in Table 2 , quantify the effects of covariates on vote choice mediated via economic and moral preferences. Those estimates are somewhat harder to interpret since they are on the (standardized) scale of the latent preference variables. A more intuitive measure of the importance of preferences is given in the 'percent mediated' columns.
There I calculate how much of the total effect of a covariate on the propensity to vote for a redistributive party is due to economic and moral preferences, respectively (Ditlevsen et al. 2005) .
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Looking over the coefficients describing indirect effects, I find a pattern that is to be expected from my previous results: both economic and moral preferences are relevant factors between social position and the redistributive vote. For economic variables, such as income, education or being in an (dis-) advantageous labor market position, Table 2 indicates that the proportion mediated by preferences is larger for economic characteristics compared to religion. However, it is less surprising to find that income is strongly related to redistributive voting via economic preferences, than to find that economic preferences matter significantly for religious individuals as well. Indeed, I find that while for both Catholics and Protestants, economic and moral issues are relevant in determining voting, economics is more important than morals: the percentage of religion's mediated effect is two to three times larger in the economic preferences equation. Contrarily, for individuals who attend church more regularly, moral issues (or, more precisely, homosexuality) is a more important factor.
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However, a strict statistical test of the relevance of economic vis-a-vis moral preferences needs to be based on their relative differences. Thus, for each relevant social character-26 It is worth stressing that the model specification is based on the theoretically implied order of effects, in other words, one expects that social position shapes preferences and ultimately vote choice. However, as one of my reviewers suggests, for a subset of individuals the reverse might be true, e.g., changes in their moral preferences affect their propensity to identify with a Christian denomination. To differentiate between these possibilities further research in single countries using repeated observations, such as household panel data, will be needed. 27 Calculating the proportion of denomination effects explained by preferences is done as follows. Let d be a dummy indicating the column of x giving the denomination of individual i and β ·d the associated effect coefficient. Then the proportions π of the effect of denomination mediated by moral issue or redistribution preferences is given by (Ditlevsen et al. 2005; MacKinnon et al. 2007 ):
28 As one of my reviewers rightly pointed out, one could expect the relevance of moral (and possible economic) preferences to rise if more detailed measures, covering a broader range of issues, would be available. For both Catholics and Protestants, economic preferences play a larger role than moral issues in determining their redistributive party choice. The difference in relevance is 8
percentage points with 95% intervals that do not cross zero -indicating that this is a statistically reliable finding. This result once more underscores the credibility of the religious identity hypothesis, which links religious identity to economic preferences and to vote choice.
The opposite picture emerges for the role of church attendance. It shapes an individual's vote choice more through its effect on moral preferences: the proportion of an individual's choice for a redistributive party mediated by moral preferences is three times as large as that mediated by economic ones. The calculated difference in Figure 4 illustrates that church attendance has a significantly stronger indirect effect via moral than economic preferences. It's estimated difference is only surpassed in relative magnitude by the role of income, whose effect on vote choice operates almost exclusively through economic preferences. Thus, while there exists a significant link between church integration, economic preferences and redistribute vote choice, as I have argued following the religious insurance argument by Scheve and Stasavage (2006) , the major factor shaping redistributive non-voting among churchgoing citizens is their moral conservatism. Thus, it seems that integration in a moral community, like a local church, increases the salience of moral issues to such an extent that they become a determining factor in individuals' vote choice.
A reverse causal explanation is, of course, that those morally conservative individuals to whom social-moral political issues are of high importance choose to attend church more regularly. However, in both scenarios the economic insurance aspect of church integration is less relevant than expected by the religious insurance argument.
Conclusion
In this paper, I tackled the question, why individuals do note vote for redistributive parties (Roemer 1998) . I focus on a micro-level explanation, arguing that religion plays a crucial role in 'preventing' individuals from voting for parties offering redistribution policies. The role of religion is twofold. First, and not surprisingly, it shapes individuals' moral preferences. Religious individuals hold more conservative positions on moral issues, and living in increasingly secularized societies they turn to conservative parties which promise to implement such conservative policies. Second, and more importantly, religion does shape individuals' economic preferences. Those who identify with one of the major christian denominations hold clear anti-welfare views and prefer more conservative economic policies.
Therefore, they are are less likely to vote for a redistributive party, irrespective of other socio-economic characteristics. This identity effect of religion does not differ between Catholics and Protestants, substantiating the argument that in a secular environment, the main cleavage lies between religious and secular individuals. My findings are based on an explicit structural model (as called for by e.g. Bartle 1998 ). Thus, in contrast to an earlier study of religion, economic, and moral preferences and voting by De La O and Rodden (2008) , this allows me to specify an explicit causal pathway from religion to preferences and vote choice, and to assert the higher relative importance of economic preferences vis-a-vis moral ones.
Observed vote choices which might be depicted as going against individuals 'obvious'
interests (Frank 2004) , like a religious worker, who does not prefer redistributive polices (Bartels 2005) , are far from irrational or erratic. They are a consequent choice based on strongly held economic and moral preferences resulting from one's social identity. Even in the secular societies of Western Europe, religion still plays a major role in defining a yardstick on which (some) individuals orient their beliefs and preferences.
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My findings suggest that even for scholars studying advanced welfare states, religion is a topic that should not be neglected. Religious individuals hold distinct preferences and they cast their vote in predictable ways. Their preferences are bound to be reflected in social policies and in parties' strategies, since they are more likely than secular citizens to show up at the polls. 30 Understanding the role of religion in shaping policy, and how policy itself shapes identities and preferences will add another facet to our understanding of socio-structural and political sources of social inequality. 29 One should note that the current results are limited to Western European countries, although the theoretical argument is general and should hold for other advanced industrialized countries as well (cf. Roemer 1998) . It is also possible that other dimensions of conflict, e.g. race in the U.S., overshadow religion's salience. However this is beyond the scope of the current paper. 30 The odds of turnout are roughly 50% higher for religious individuals, controlling for age, income, education, social class and gender (calculated from ESS data used in this paper). 
A Appendix
Robustness tests
There might exist substantial country variation in both vote choice and preference equations, and effects of, say, being Catholic or Protestant on redistribution preferences might vary strongly between countries. This heterogeneity might indicate that general statements about direction and magnitude of effects given in the main paper are misleading (cf. Morgan and Winship 2010) . Therefore, I estimate a model that allows for unobserved country heterogeneity of my central variables by including varying effect coefficients. To simplify notation, let γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 ). Now the model defined above is extended by specifying country-varying effects of preferences and religion on vote choice:
where again remove parts of the data, re-estimate the model several times, and penalize standard errors for varying coefficient estimates. Results of this procedure are given in Table A .7, which shows estimates and standard errors from 5 subsets of data, generated by randomly deleting one-third of all cases. Both strategies lead to virtually identical results compared to the specification used in the main paper. 
